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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 134 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 24/12/1997 
Where it occurred: Kabul Darwaza, Ward 
3, Kandahar city 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: building rubble 
residential/urban 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
use of shovel (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
 
1 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available. The 
following summarises its content.  
Both victims had been deminers for seven years and had attended a revision course three 
months before the accident. It was 22 days since their last leave. On the day of the accident 
they were working in a "collapsed residential" area. A photograph showed the accident site 
50cm from a high wall on land littered with loose earth and rubble.  
The investigators determined that Victim No.1 was investigating a pile of spoil deposited by 
the back-hoe when he got a continuous detector reading and started excavating with a long 
handled shovel. He detonated a mine. The mine was identified as a PMN (by "found 
fragments"). 
A photograph of a damaged shovel (handle and head separated) was included in the report. 
The Team Leader said the deminer was excavating a reading with a shovel and used it at the 
incorrect angle. He said the pick should be allowed for prodding. 
The Section Leader said that the deminer was working properly but must have applied too 
much pressure on the shovel. 
The Team Leader said the deminer was excavating a reading with a shovel and used it at the 
incorrect angle. He said the pick should be allowed for prodding. 
The Section Leader said that the deminer was working properly but must have applied too 
much pressure on the shovel. 
The victim's partner (Victim No.2) said he was 5-6 metres from the deminer when the 
accident occurred and he did not know why it had happened. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the deminer ignored technical procedures when 
investigating a reading, the deminer's partner ignored safety distance requirements, and that 
the command group failed to exercise effective control.  
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that deminers should wear helmet and frag-jacket when 
investigating the spoil from a back-hoe, that deminers must maintain safety distances, and 
that the Section Leader should be warned for poor performance. [The recommendation to 
wear frag-jackets is interpreted as a request for body protection.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 170 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 
2 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Hearing 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
Victim No.1's injuries were summarised as: injuries to ears [a sketch indicated injury to both 
ears, which were bleeding] 
Letters to the insurers indicated that the victim was moderately deafened and off work until 9th 
January 1998. He also suffered depression.  
No record of compensation was found in June 1998.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 171 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: medic  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Eye 
minor Face 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
Victim's No.2’s injuries were summarised as abrasions to the head [a sketch indicated a 
single abrasion on the right temporal lobe]. 
Letters to the insurers indicated that the victim was a nurse and that he sustained an injury to 
his left eye [not mentioned before] and did not mention the head injury. 
No record of compensation was found in June 1998.  
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Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because, from the 
investigator's recommendations, it is inferred that visors were not worn when the accident 
occurred. This indicates a failure of supervision. The close proximity of Victim No.2 to the 
blast is not explained and indicates a further failure of field supervision as recognised by the 
investigators. 
It is possible that the visors provided were too damaged to see through properly (as was seen 
frequently during 1998), in which case the failure to provide useable equipment may 
represent a serious management failing.  
It is clear from the statements of field supervisors that they considered the use of a shovel to 
excavate was “correct” procedure. This implies failing of training or communication among 
management levels. 
The use of the shovel and an upright position to "excavate" were both in breach of UN 
requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those 
requirements.  The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for 
local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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